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Abstract 
In many European countries, community entrepreneurship is increasingly considered as a means 
to initiate small-scale urban regeneration in the context of austerity policies and welfare state 
retrenchment. However, residents in deprived neighbourhoods are often viewed to lack key 
entrepreneurial attributes and skills. While there is research on community entrepreneurship 
support, most evidence is based on cross-sectional studies and overly focussed on support 
provided through government policies. This paper extends the current body of knowledge by 
reporting a unique national experiment in the Netherlands with nascent community enterprises 
which received start-up support from a private foundation. The paper aims is to investigate how 
active citizens perceive the benefits and drawbacks of this support. The approached used is 
unique because of its longitudinal nature right from the start of the experiment. The paper 
provides an in-depth analysis of transcriptions of repeated semi-structured interviews with the 
same respondents (panel design) from nascent community enterprises in a number of Dutch 
deprived neighbourhoods. While positive feedback on the support is found, the study provides 
strong evidence for a ‘support paradox’: the support that was intended to overcome a number of 
entry barriers and difficulties on the road to community entrepreneurship has in fact 
significantly hampered progress among several of the studied community enterprises. 
 
Keywords: community entrepreneurship, active citizenship, urban regeneration, self-
organisation, The Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is commonly believed to improve the economic strength and 
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innovation of countries and cities, but also of neighbourhoods and local communities 
(Baumol et al., 2007; Shane, 2009; Mason et al., 2015). However, the relationship 
between community and entrepreneurship is a relatively neglected topic in the literature, 
partly because of the emphasis on individual entrepreneurs (Ratten and Welpe, 2011; 
Lyons et al., 2012 et al., 2012; Fortunato and Alter, 2015). Ronald Coase, the winner of 
the 1991 Nobel Prize for economy, has labelled the relation between entrepreneurship 
and community as the next true frontier for entrepreneurship research (Coase and Wang, 
2011, cited in Lyons et al., 2012, 19). 
 In this context, the rise of various forms of community-based entrepreneurship 
across Europe is both interesting and relevant. Due to the economic crisis, many 
countries have been implementing austerity measures and cuts in public policy, 
alongside longer trends of welfare retrenchment. To compensate for austerity regimes 
and welfare retrenchment, governments are putting more emphasis on active citizenship. 
Citizens are expected to take responsibility and organise themselves to fill in gaps left 
by government spending cuts in health care, education, employment and neighbourhood 
governance (Wells, 2011; Newman and Tonkens, 2011; Bailey and Pill, 2015). 
Resident-organised, community-based entrepreneurial activities are increasingly seen as 
solutions for deficiencies in public services and neighbourhood regeneration efforts 
(Bailey, 2012). Community enterprises often arise “from a perception that there are 
serious deficiencies in a particular area which need to be addressed and where the 
perception is that other agencies are unlikely to provide solutions. These deficiencies 
may be defined in social, economic and demographic terms as degrees of deprivation, 
poor health, inadequate housing or a lack of community facilities. These perceptions 
motivate individuals and groups to combine together to set up an organisation which 
can begin to provide solutions” (Bailey, 2012, 26, see also Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; 
Somerville and McElwee, 2011). 
 However, a major concern is that especially those citizens most in need, in the 
most deprived neighbourhoods, have the least capacity to solve problems in own their 
communities (Kisby, 2010; Painter et al., 2011). On the one hand, stimulating 
entrepreneurship in deprived neighbourhoods is seen as a crucial element in 
strengthening economic development through the creation of jobs and increased labour 
productivity, as well as increasing social inclusion (Blackburn and Ram, 2006; Welter et 
al., 2008; Lyons, 2015). On the other hand, residents in deprived communities are often 
viewed to lack key entrepreneurial attributes and skills (OECD, 2003; Williams and 
Huggins, 2013, 168). This ‘vacuum’ between citizens and governments is the starting 
point of policies “to help citizens to help themselves” across European countries. 
Although the literature on community enterprises is relatively small, studies have 
reported on initiatives in the UK (Bailey, 2012; Williams and Huggins, 2013), Germany 
(Welter et al., 2008; Zimmer and Bräuer, 2014), Norway (Bjørnå and Aarsæther, 2010), 
Sweden (Lundqvist and Middleton, 2010; Sundin, 2011), and the USA (Varady et al., 
2015). 
 This paper contributes to the scientific and policy discussion on supporting 
community entrepreneurship in (mostly) deprived neighbourhoods by providing an 
account of the paradoxical effects of a national community enterprise project in the 
Netherlands. While Dutch examples of community enterprise are not necessarily 
restricted to deprived neighbourhoods, it is this particular spatial and social context 
which generates the strongest interest in the potential of CEs to generate benefits for 
local communities. The aim of the paper is to get more insight in how active citizens 
perceive the benefits and drawbacks of support provided for their attempts to establish a 
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community enterprise. A particularly interesting feature of this study is that the support 
for developing entrepreneurship is provided by a private foundation, while the majority 
of the literature on community entrepreneurship deals with government policies. Our 
study is unique in that it follows an experiment with nascent community enterprise start-
ups right from the start by using a panel design with repeated semi-structured interviews 
with the same respondents. This research approach meets the repeated calls in the 
literature for more longitudinal, qualitative and inductive approaches in research related 
to entrepreneurship (Dana and Dana, 1995; Hopp and Stephan, 2012; Henry and Foss, 
2015), which has hitherto been dominated by quantitative approaches. 
 The next section lays the foundation for this study by discussing the relevant 
literature on community-based entrepreneurship and support policies. The following 
section introduces the support project in more detail, followed by an explanation of our 
approach, data and analytical strategy. Subsequently, several sections report the main 
outcomes from the transcript analysis. The final section presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Supporting Community Entrepreneurship   
 
2.1 The nature of community enterprises 
In the Introduction, we explained how active citizenship is framed as a viable alternative 
to state-based welfare provision which is reduced by austerity regimes and welfare 
retrenchment. Of particular interest in the current scientific, societal and policy context 
are entrepreneurial forms of active citizenship, such as social enterprises, which reflect 
the permeation of neoliberal values into civil society (Dart, 2004). Community 
Enterprises (CEs), like social enterprises (SEs), have a strong commercial ethos and 
generate a substantial part of their revenue through trading, relying upon ‘enterprise’ 
rather than government subsidy to finance their social objectives (Tracey et al., 2005, 
335). There are also differences between CEs and SEs. First, CEs define their social 
purpose in relation to a defined population or sub-group living in a spatially defined 
area (Bailey, 2012, 4; Pierre et al., 2014, 253), whereas SEs are not by definition tied to 
a specific area. Second, unlike many SEs, CEs are built on strong local linkages and 
also have democratic structures which enable involvement of organisational members in 
the governance of the enterprise (Pearce, 2003; Tracey et al., 2005, 335). 
 Compared to the literature on SEs (Bacq and Janssen 2011), the volume of work 
on CEs is still relatively limited, and so is the number of definitions. Based on the work 
of Pearce (2003), Peredo and Chrisman (2006), Teasdale (2010), Somerville and 
McElwee (2011), Bailey (2012), Pierre et al. (2015) and Healey (2015), CEs are here 
defined as businesses which are: 
 established by people living and/or working in a (spatially) defined community, 
 independent, not-for-private-profit organisations, which are owned and/or 
managed by community members, 
 locally accountable and highly committed to delivering long-term benefits to 
local people, by providing specific goods or services, 
 seeking to generate a surplus through, at least in part, engaging in trade in the 
marketplace, and reinvest the surplus in the business or community,  
 bearing economic risks related to their activity, and are very committed to 
involving local people and other partners in their activities. 
 
The goods or services delivered by CEs may vary from a range of community facilities 
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(shops, pubs, recreational or health facilities), community centres and community 
development to affordable housing, property management and consultancy services. 
CEs need to acquire funding in various forms (subsidies, loans) to start up their 
activities, not just the ones that contribute to their objectives, but also those that cover 
operational costs. Key to the functioning of CEs is that they acquire assets, i.e. 
buildings, land or other sources from which they can draw capital. In entrepreneurial 
terms, community enterprises are looking for niche markets without a potential to attract 
fully commercial entrepreneurs (Bailey, 2012). Many CEs arise in (former) urban 
regeneration target areas, where regeneration programs have come to a stop, creating 
both challenges and opportunities for CEs (Carpenter, 2013; Varady et al., 2015). 
 Despite the scientific and societal relevance of CEs, there is surprisingly little 
empirical research on community-based entrepreneurship in Western Europe (Bailey, 
2012; Pierre et al., 2014; Fortunato and Alter, 2015). Bailey (2012) analysed five case 
studies in multiple localities while others focus on one specific CE case study (Teasdale, 
2010; Smith, 2012; Van Meerkerk et al., 2013; Healey, 2015). The literature shows that 
CEs usually forge alliances with various stakeholders, including (local) governments. 
Over time, many CEs have transformed from ‘subsidy-dependent’ resident councils to 
community-based enterprises. In this vein, Selsky and Smith (1994) have described 
community entrepreneurship as a type of leadership that is appropriate for practicing 
social change. They assert that “community-based social change settings are highly 
dynamic and complex. They are characterized by diverse interests, temporary and fluid 
alliances, and fast-paced and equivocal events that confound traditional leadership 
concepts” (Selsky and Smith, 1994, 277; Ratten and Welpe, 2011). Thus, “community 
entrepreneurs play their most critical role in developing the collective capacities of 
organisations sharing interests in one or more community issues” (ibid., 278). 
 With reference Bourdieu (1986), Somerville and McElwee (2011, 323) argue 
that CE can be understood in terms of capital that is simultaneously economic, social 
and cultural, by creating wealth, developing community and transforming local culture. 
Social capital can enable entrepreneurship. The mutuality of shared interests encourages 
and engages entrepreneurs in sharing entrepreneurial expertise (McKeever et al., 2014). 
A “primary strength of community enterprise is that it can harness social capital in local 
communities and use it to achieve positive outcomes through mobilizing volunteers, 
board members and paid staff” (Bailey, 2012, 30). CEs never work in isolation but 
usually co-operate with local actors, building relationships with other organisations are 
crucial to CEs (Ratten and Welpe, 2011; Smith, 2012; Healey, 2015). According to 
Fortunato and Alter (2015, 450), “the field of entrepreneurship continues to witness a 
deep transition from thinking about entrepreneurship as an individualistic effort, 
supported by community actors – toward one that sees entrepreneurship as a socially 
embedded, community-wide effort where many actors can contribute”. 
 
2.2 Supporting community entrepreneurship in deprived neighbourhoods 
Many European countries have witnessed decades of urban regeneration policies, which 
have not been altogether successful in economic terms. In an attempt to boost the 
economic regeneration of deprived urban areas, policy makers turned to approaches for 
fostering entrepreneurship specifically at local levels (OECD 2003). Harnessing 
entrepreneurship in such areas is considered a key element in enhancing economic 
development through job creation and increased productivity, as well as ensuring 
heightened social inclusion (Williams and Huggins, 2013, 166; see also Blackburn and 
Ram, 2006; Lyons, 2015). The nature of support policies for deprived areas varies, 
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depending on the national and local context and governance structures. 
 However, such support approaches have been criticised for various reasons. The 
first reason is a risk of overestimating the positive impacts of start-ups in deprived 
neighbourhoods once they have received support to establish themselves. According to 
Shane (2009, 141), “policy makers believe a dangerous myth” in thinking that start-ups 
are “a magic bullet” that will transform depressed areas and “conduct all sorts of other 
economic wizardry”. Blackburn and Ram (2006, 85) claim that “the policy ‘fad’ of 
uncritically advocating that entrepreneurship is a key route for improving individual and 
societal economic development” should be avoided. 
A second and related reason for critique concerns the question whether you can 
“make” entrepreneurs. Within deprived communities, residents are often viewed to be 
lacking in key entrepreneurial attributes and skills (OECD, 2003; Welter et al., 2008; 
Williams and Huggins, 2013). This is part of a larger concern that especially those 
citizens most in need, in the most deprived neighbourhoods, have the least capacity to 
solve problems in own their communities, and therefore still need support. However, 
“policy interventions in deprived urban neighbourhoods need to consider that providing 
incentives to individuals who do not necessarily have the skills, knowledge or capacity 
to succeed as an entrepreneur may result in low-quality entrepreneurship being 
fostered” (Williams and Williams, 2012, 666; see also Greene et al., 2007; Welter et al., 
2008). According to Shane (2009, 143), “not the best entrepreneurs” are the most likely 
to respond to policy incentives. Compared to people with paid jobs, unemployed people 
will be more likely to respond because they “have less to lose by becoming 
entrepreneurs”. Additionally, “unsubsidized and/or unsupported traders may be pushed 
out, resulting in little or no impact on the local economy” (Williams and Huggins, 2013, 
175). For this reason, Shane asserts that “policy makers need to ‘stop spreading the 
peanut butter so thin’ […] and concentrate time and money on extraordinary 
entrepreneurs, and worry less about the typical ones” (ibid., 146). 
A third reason is a lack of understanding regarding the role of community in 
shaping entrepreneurship and providing for entrepreneurs’ needs, and therefore lack of 
proper community-oriented support strategies. Much of the literature focuses on what 
makes individual firms successful, rather than what makes communities successful 
(Fortunato and Alter, 2015). Dana and Dana (2005) reviewed research that places 
entrepreneurship in the context of its environment, showing that entrepreneurship is 
culture-bound and that policy on entrepreneurship should therefore be culture-specific. 
Because communities consist of social networks, shared identities, norms, values and 
common practices, they have their own local cultures. Cultures of entrepreneurship vary 
across population groups and spatial areas (Williams, 2007; Hopp and Stephan, 2012). 
Hence, “if economic and community development policies use traditional business 
strategies to support entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial development while ignoring 
culture, that strategy will likely fail or at best achieve sub-optimal performance” 
(Fortunato and Alter, 2015, 448). Others have found limited use of formal enterprise 
support services, which may be the result of negative perceptions regarding whom it is 
for, availability and bureaucracy (Williams and Huggins, 2013, 175). Ultimately, the 
result of well-intended support may be a condition of disentrepreneurship. 
Disentrepreneurship refers to a situation in which “a community creates, either 
systematically or by accident, an environment unsuitable for establishment or 
sustainability of existing entrepreneurial activities. It may do this through public policy 
initiatives that penalize or prohibit entrepreneurial activities, by promoting cultural 
values and norms that discourage entrepreneurship, or by failing to create the required 
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legal, institutional and structural environment necessary for entrepreneurship to become 
established” (Honig and Dana, 2008, 11). 
A fourth reason for criticising support policies for (community) entrepreneurship 
is a simplistic perspective on motivations of entrepreneurs. As mentioned earlier, the 
communis opinio among policymakers is that entrepreneurship may provide avenues out 
of economic adversity and poverty, implying that entrepreneurship is born straight out 
of necessity. However, “situations of adversity can provide opportunities for individuals 
to respond in an entrepreneurial fashion, for example by starting a business to cater for 
local needs” (Blackburn and Ram, 2006, 77, see also Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; 
Bailey, 2012). Already in 1995, Dana distinguished three general types of (potential) 
entrepreneurs. A first type may be ‘opportunity seekers’, who are driven by cultural 
values such as thrift and frugality, while others have psychological characteristics such 
as a high sense of achievement or aim for social changes in ‘the community’. A second 
type includes residents who lost their regular job and subsequently venture into 
entrepreneurial activities to increase their income and social status and decrease their 
‘marginality in society’. A third type are entrepreneurs who identify a market 
opportunity, either by ‘stumbling across’ it or by alertness (Dana, 1995, 60). In their 
study of entrepreneurs’ motivations in deprived neighbourhoods, Williams and 
Williams (2012, 674) found that “the motivations could not be solely classified as 
‘necessity’ or ‘opportunity’ based. Rather, necessity and opportunity were both co-
present, and motivations were influenced by the locality of the entrepreneurs”. They 
conclude that a dichotomy of understanding entrepreneurial motivations in terms of 
either necessity or opportunity is misleading and simplistic.  
In sum, the literature has revealed a number of shortcomings of community 
entrepreneurship support, which are partly the result of a lack of understanding of the 
complex relation between entrepreneurship and ‘community’. 
 
 
3. A Support Project for Dutch Community Enterprises 
 
In this section we will introduce the community enterprise support project that was the 
focus of our panel study on nascent community enterprises in the Netherlands. The 
project was initiated and led by the non-profit organisation LSA; the National 
Association of Active Residents (Landelijk Samenwerkingsverband Actieve Bewoners). 
The LSA is a platform of approximately 70 residents from different associations spread 
over the Netherlands. It is a small private non-governmental organisation, consisting of 
a general director, project managers and support staff, which receives a large part of its 
funding through the Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Since its inception, LSA has looked 
for ways to strengthen the voice of residents in neighbourhood (regeneration) policies 
and to stimulate bottom-up initiatives of single residents or groups to improve the 
quality of life in their communities (see http://www.lsabewoners.nl/en/). 
Inspired by British community enterprises and the role of Locality (a sister 
organisation of LSA in the UK) in supporting such initiatives, the LSA took the 
initiative to start experimenting with community-based entrepreneurship in the 
Netherlands. LSA gained political and financial support from the Dutch government, € 
2 million from the Dutch Lottery Fund (Nationale Postcode Loterij) and money from 
the Fund Working on Housing (Fonds Werken aan Wonen) (LSA, 2011, 2015). In July 
2012, the Project Community Enterprises (Project Bewonersbedrijven) officially kicked 
off with a number of residents groups which expressed a willingness to work towards 
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fitting the principles below. The basic idea behind the experiment was to explore 
whether and how the British concept of CEs can be transferred to the Dutch context 
while being aware of the difficulties of transferring practices between the highly 
different British and Dutch contexts. To guide the experiment, the LSA (2011) has 
formulated four principles around which Dutch CEs should revolve: 
 
1. CEs work on economic, physical and social development of an area which is 
recognised by residents as a meaningful unit (i.e. a community). 
2. CEs are independent, self-sufficient and profits flow back into the own 
neighbourhood and will not accrue to private persons. 
3. CEs are initiated by residents, owned by residents and managed by residents. 
4. CEs are focussed on collaboration with resident associations, local governments, 
other institutions and (local) business. 
 
A key characteristic of the LSA support project was that nascent CEs could apply for a 
starting grant (seed money) of a maximum of €200,000 if they submitted a business 
plan which was subsequently approved by an external evaluation committee with 
representatives from business, private enterprise and community development work. 
 Besides the potential of receiving a starting grant, LSA also offered other types 
of support in setting up a CE. This support ranged from information meetings and fact 
sheets, to individual counselling and information brokering on site by LSA counsellors. 
Fact sheets included, for example, legal information related to establishing a foundation, 
the legal form for CEs preferred by LSA. To enable knowledge exchange beyond the 
initiatives themselves, thematic readers were compiled, dealing with issues of writing a 
business plan, entrepreneurship, collaboration, finance, accounting, management, and 
public procurement, as well as check lists for creating a vision, internal policies (e.g. on 
volunteers) and liability. 
 Counselling has played a key role in the support efforts of LSA, especially in the 
planning and starting phase of nascent CEs. LSA started out with a full-time counsellor 
and a supporting secretary, but shortly after the start of the project this capacity was 
already insufficient, because the amount of support needed by the start-ups was higher 
than expected. The main counsellor was replaced by three regionally based external 
counsellors and one central project manager. Approximately one-and-a-half year in the 
project, this combination was again replaced by a main counsellor, a project manager 
for supporting the development of business models and a secretary. In addition, the 
director of LSA also provided counselling to CEs. Acknowledging the limited staff 
capacity, the aim of LSA subsequently shifted from providing support to arranging 
tailored local external support for CEs. As such, the networking function of the LSA has 
become increasingly important over time, at the expense of providing support by her 
own staff members (Kleinhans et al., 2015).  
 An important element of the Dutch CEs that joined the experiment is their 
organisational structure. Based on British experiences with managing CEs, LSA has 
developed a basic organisational model for CEs participating in the support project. The 
model implies that a CE has a resident board which is responsible for the CE’s vision 
and direction, and is responsible and liable for its activities. While the majority of board 
members should be residents from the target community, external experts can also be 
recruited. The board employs a main entrepreneur, who can be paid from the starting 
grant, and who is in charge of management and developing entrepreneurship and 
activities to generate income. In the context of the aforementioned four principles, this 
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structure is supposed to guarantee CE ownership by residents. 
 A final element of the support project is that LSA has consistently labelled it as 
a learning process, implying that there is usually no unidirectional flow of coaching and 
information from LSA to CEs, but that there is continuing development of knowledge 
and concepts while tackling all problems encountered during the project (LSA, 2015).  
 It is important to add a critical note here on the process as described above. Seen 
from the outside, the process is very top down and regulated, while the underlying 
objective is to stimulate active citizens in taking matters in their own hands and ‘free’ 
them from ‘policy reigns’, something of which LSA has claimed that it never occurred 
during the periods of state-led and state supported urban renewal since the 1970s (LSA, 
2011). Hence, the paper will investigate how active citizens attempting to establish a 
community enterprise, perceive the benefits and drawbacks of the LSA support. 
 
 
4. Approach and Methods  
 
The data used in this study was collected by a team of university-based researchers led 
by the authors of this paper, and funded by the Ministry of the Interior and the LSA. 
The funders took part in the advisory board of the research project, but the researchers 
were independent and responsible for reporting the outcomes of the study. The 
researchers conducted a panel study of 16 different CE start-ups across the Netherlands 
and followed them for almost three years (July 2012-February 2015). The study group 
of initiatives is not a random sample, but consists of self-selected groups of residents 
which matched the LSA principles for the experiment. We make no claims about similar 
initiatives outside the experiment, or the representativeness of the case studies for other 
initiatives. 
Considering that we are dealing with a relatively new, highly context-embedded 
phenomenon in the Netherlands and an exploratory search lead by a ‘how’ question (see 
Yin, 2012), we have chosen to adopt a case study approach. There are too many 
variables at stake to apply a more (quantitative) research design. Henry and Foss (2015, 
403) have argued that the case method has not been used frequently in entrepreneurship 
research to date because it is not yet fully accepted as a legitimate research approach. 
They have demonstrated the merits and added value of the case study approach, 
dismissing criticisms in relation to reliability, generalizability and theory building 
capacity as “both disproportionate and out-dated” (ibid.). According to Dana and Dana 
(2005), inductive designs of qualitative research are more appropriate for new theories 
and understanding (community) entrepreneurs’ dynamic interactions with their 
environment than hypothetico-deductive (quantitative) methodologies. 
Of the 16 nascent CEs which we followed, 10 are relevant for the purpose of this 
paper, because they went through all stages of the LSA support, including the 
submission of a business plan for a starting grant. The study was divided in two phases. 
In phase 1, we included all case studies and monitored their progress in their 
preparatory efforts. At the end of phase 2, we made a selection of initiatives that had 
made significant progress towards starting a CE. In Phase 2, we further focused our 
research on this selection of nascent CEs. During this phase, two new cases were added 
to the selection because of their quick progress. 
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Table 1  A brief overview of the case studies  
City Name of the CE Assets and main component of 
the business model 
Interviewed 
stakeholders (n=21) 
Amersfoort Kruiskamp Onderneemt! Renting out office/work spaces, 
recreation facilities 
Two initiators and 
one board member 
Arnhem Bewonersbedrijf Malburgen Renting out rooms and office 
spaces, cheap restaurant 
Board chair and the 
main entrepreneur 
Emmen BewonersBedrijf Op Eigen 
Houtje 
Renting out office/work spaces, 
food and health, recreation 
facilities 
Two initiators and 
the main entrepre-
neur 
Haarlem ‘t Badhuis Renting out recreation spaces 
and reception rooms 
Three initiators 
Hengelo Bewonersbedrijf Berflo Es Services, facilities, maintenance 
of public space 
One board member 
and the main 
entrepreneur 
Hengelo** Bewonersbedrijf ‘t Geerdink Services, facilities Chair of the CE 
board 
Leeuwarden BewonersBedrijf Heechterp-
Schieringen (BBHS) 
Service provision, maintenance 
of public spaces 
One board member 
and the main 
entrepreneur 
Sittard Not yet established - Two initiators 
Venray Not yet established - Two initiators 
Zaanstad** BewonersBedrijven 
Zaanstad 
Renting out office spaces, 
providing care, renovation 
works 
Initiator 
   ** These cases were added in the second stage of the research and have been studied in two rounds instead of 
four. 
  
Using a panel design, we have conducted repeated interviews (2-4 times in three years), 
observations and document analysis. The interviews were targeted at the initiators of 
CEs, board members, the main entrepreneurs in the CEs, and professionals from local 
governments and housing associations who were closely involved in the initiatives. In 
most of the cases in Table 1, we have visited the research sites multiple times, which is 
one of the strategies offered by Guba and Lincoln (1982) to overcome problems related 
to credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of case study research.  
 Interviews were conducted at the premises of the respondents, based on a semi-
structured interview guide that included a range of open-ended questions regarding the 
aims of nascent CEs, the development of their  business plan and activities, their staff 
composition (paid staff and volunteers), and their opinions on the support provided by 
the LSA. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours and were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed verbatim for content analysis. We then conducted a thematic 
analysis of the transcripts, based on the inductive approach suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). Their contribution to qualitative research methodology is renowned 
for its focus on the analysis of case data. They argue that an inductive, iterative 
approach should be adopted, in which documentary evidence, interview transcripts, 
supporting notes and other materials need to be read and re-read several times to allow 
key issues and themes to emerge and be coded. We identified five overarching but 
related themes of interest in the research context: (1) support and seed money as a sine 
qua non, (2) inadequate support and changing preconditions (3), strict guidance and 
little room for experimentation, (4) contradictions between project principles and 
practice, and (5), the need for professionalization of all involved actors. Our analysis of 
interview transcripts does not imply any claim of ‘authenticity’ of ‘verificational 
realism’ (Crang, 2002), but is able to unearth common and different experiences among 
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the interview respondents. 
Subsequently, we coded text in the interview transcripts which corresponded to 
these themes and labels in more detail. Third, we analysed connections between the 
emergent themes. In order to safeguard their anonymity, respondents are denoted by 
their role in the respective CE only, leaving out references to locations (see Table 1). 
Counsellors of LSA who have been mentioned by name during the interviews are 
denoted with a fictitious name. Below, the paper turns to the results of the interviews, 
which will provide detailed insights in how active citizens perceive the benefits and 
drawbacks of support provided. 
 
 
5. Results of the Interviews 
 
5.1 Support and seed money as a sine qua non 
As mentioned in section 3, LSA has deployed a range of efforts to support resident 
groups in the process of starting up their own CE. A key element has been the one-to-
one counselling provided by LSA staff to individual CE members. All interviewed 
respondents acknowledged the fundamental role of both the seed money and setting the 
right steps towards acquiring this, through counselling: 
 
“Counselling of LSA? That was absolutely necessary. We initially got stuck 
in ideas. You have several ideas as a community enterprise, you want to do 
something, but you don’t know what the next step should be. And then it 
was great that Fiona from LSA came along. She said, ‘well guys, get a sieve 
and filter your ideas, and start with the basis.”   (CE board member) 
 
While one of the four key principles of CEs in the support project is that they should be 
independent and self-sufficient, this does not apply to the process of starting up the 
business. Some respondents claimed that the seed money is a necessary precondition: 
 
Interviewer: “To what extent do you feel that LSA is a condition here? 
Respondent: Yes, it forces you to act. You need the seed money to start the 
enterprise. And the precondition for the money is a decent business plan. So 
yes, no plan, no money and everything.”   (CE initiators) 
 
The fact that the business plan was an indispensable element part of the process of 
acquiring the seed money from LSA has resulted in a number of problems in the co-
operation between LSA and residents groups that were trying to establish their CE. This 
is an issue that we will analyse in full detail. 
 
5.2 Inadequate support and unclear and changing preconditions 
Apart from varying starting up issues, almost all respondents have struggled (or are still 
struggling) with the business plan. In the process towards submitting the business plan 
to the external evaluation committee, resident groups have asked for and implemented 
the advice of LSA counsellors who were not part of this committee (see section 3). In 
some cases, respondents feel that they have received incorrect advice regarding the 
structure and content of the business plan, and attribute the rejection by the evaluation 
committee to this matter: 
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“Yes, we were summoned to the external evaluation committee to present 
our business plan. Our plan has been declared unfit on several points and 
thus we did not get the seed money. We are working very hard to improve 
this [...]. The committee, they missed the soul of the story. And that’s 
correct… Based on advice from LSA, we removed several sections from the 
plan to improve readability. But if I look closely to the comments of the 
evaluation committee, we exactly removed those points that they missed in 
the story, but were present in the original version of the plan.”   (CE 
initiators) 
 
This experience has not been unique. Several respondents have observed that the criteria 
for the business plans were not clear in advance and gradually unfolded during the 
support project and the process of all CEs writing business plans. This has resulted in 
inconsistent advice, confusion and many required revisions: 
 
“Well, LSA has not always been clear in her expectations, for example on 
how they wanted to see the business plan and its components. So you need 
to work that out completely for yourself. And the moment that you submit 
it, adding ‘ this is how we feel it should look like’, then ‘wait a minute…’ 
Interviewer: They say it should look different? 
Respondent: Yes, it should look like this and this and then you can go home 
and start revising it again.”   (CE board member).  
 
Some interviews reflected on the lack of requirements at the outset, explaining that they 
had expected a consensus between the evaluation committee and LSA staff members, so 
that criteria could have been agreed upon. But they stumbled across a non-existent 
consensus, which is clearly worded by one of the respondents: 
 
“And then the LSA sent Janet, who took over from Fiona …  We asked her 
how the business plan should look like and which criteria were applied by 
the external evaluation committee. But she neither knew that!! She said, 
‘let’s set the bar very high’. Well, that’s very strange, you have been part of 
an experiment for more than a year and you say that we are not doing it 
right, there are few directions, so why can’t this evaluation committee visit 
us, advise, practice with us, whatever!”  (CE board member) 
 
On several occasions, moving back and forth of the draft business plan has created a lot 
of frustration among CE members: 
 
Interviewer: “Are you being informed of the criteria for the business plan? 
Respondent: Yes, they tell you what they still miss in it. And then we revise 
it and send it in, they send it back and ask for revisions again. I think we 
have revised it roughly 45 times! And then we said ‘let’s quite this 
nonsense. We are going to write our own business plan, how we see it here, 
and that’s what we are going to do’.”   (Chair of the CE board) 
 
5.3 Strict guidance and little room for experimentation 
As explained before, LSA has envisioned that CEs in their project should revolve 
around four main principles that affect CEs’ nature and functioning. This has resulted in 
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much criticism from nascent CEs regarding a top-down ‘ideal mode’ of community 
entrepreneurship that does not adequately take into account specific local conditions and 
opportunities. The general sense among many respondents is that the principles do not 
function as a starting point for experimentation, but as a mould in which all local 
initiatives should fit, as is eloquently explained by one of the respondents: 
 
“The process is a straitjacket, it’s not completely fair. They [LSA] offer a 
pot of money as bait, which is quite a lot. 
Interviewer: Do you mean the seed money? 
Respondent: Yes, but you need to comply to their rules. But as I feel it, 
initiatives that arise in communities are always a bit anarchistic, a bit off the 
beaten track. And it now feels as if they [LSA] say, ‘Oh my goodness, 
something is happening of the track, let’s encapsulate it quickly and then it 
will go with the flow again’.”   (CE board member) 
 
Several respondents have reflected upon the label ‘experimental’ in the LSA project, 
which does not seem to resound with the actual practice of support, and explained how 
this has eroded their inspiration and motivation: 
 
“The LSA got a big pot with money to do pilots. Pilots imply openness for 
experimentation, that things can go wrong. It means that you should not 
prescribe everything beforehand, but just let it work and see whether or not 
it flourishes. The process now increasingly looks like a trap […].To what 
expense? How long can we deal with this until it wipes out our 
spontaneity?”   (CE initiator) 
 
Some respondents have connected the changes in LSA staff during the project with a 
strict adherence to a theoretical framework in order to sustain the support, but with the 
downside of prescribing the nature of local CEs, their aims and constituency: 
 
“Yes, we have seen different faces [in LSA] pass along, people with specific 
expertise who were expected to advise community enterprises, but this has 
not always run smoothly. We have repeatedly felt annoyed that we were 
lead on certain tracks, to put it this way, ‘are we actually doing the right 
thing, does it connect to our neighbourhood?’ Are we being prescribed too 
much, as in ‘you should do it this way’, based on a theoretical thinking 
about how to establish a community enterprise.” (CE board member) 
 
The latter quote touches upon another main theme in the research, which seems to 
reveal several contractions between the overarching principles of starting CEs in the 
support project (see section 3) and the unfolding practices of achieving this, both among 
LSA staff members and individual residents in starting CEs. 
 
5.4 Practice contradicts principles 
While the respondents generally agree with the four overarching principles of CEs as 
formulated by the LSA, some of them feel that their meaning was taken too literally in 
terms of the provided counselling. This observation especially applies to the second 
principle (CEs are independent) and the third principle (CEs are initiated by residents, 
owned by residents and managed by residents). Several respondents question these very 
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principles, by claiming that residents (especially from deprived neighbourhoods) lack 
the knowledge and skills to establish and subsequently manage a CE, and therefore need 
intensive support and cannot be independent, at least in the starting up phase: 
 
“What happened is that they [LSA] have thought, ‘Well, let them just mess 
around a bit, the business plan should come from themselves, we are not 
providing a pattern for it. But that is outright nonsense. 
Interviewer: Why is that? 
Respondent: People who write a business plan do have expert knowledge, 
you know, otherwise you will not start up a business. Residents lack that 
knowledge, they need help.”   (CE initiators) 
 
Others use the same principles to point out that LSA should exert more trust in the 
efforts, experimentation and outcomes of nascent CEs instead of trying to mould them 
all to a single model of community-based entrepreneurship: 
 
“Look, apparently it is difficult to digest, but this is a pilot, an experiment, 
and an experiment is allowed to fail. Of course you want to set out clear 
starting points. But if you look at the people who took the initiative, you just 
know and trust that they will succeed. Please do not make problems, LSA 
should keep that in mind and stop acting so bureaucratic! 
Interviewer: Is that what they are doing? 
Respondent: It is precisely what they blame local authorities and housing 
associations for, but they take a very firm line themselves.”   (Entrepreneur) 
 
One of the interviewees addresses the tension between bottom-up social innovation and 
the shared perception that LSA has not been very open to new ideas and concepts within 
the broader idea of community-based entrepreneurship. This particular CE is the only 
one in our study which specifically and deliberately added social care to their aims and 
core-business, in a relatively new institutional setting of ‘social neighbourhood teams’. 
Within the local social neighbourhood team, this CE has taken a role as subcontractor, 
but not to the liking of one of the LSA staff members:  
 
“This was a big discussion. Joining a social neighbourhood team, he [LSA 
staff member] thought it did not it into the concept of community enterprise. 
But we argued, ‘John, listen, this is quite innovative. Please think along with 
us, we feel that this is the future’. But no, it seems as if LSA has become 
exactly the type of old-fashioned institutions they are fighting against…. So 
if you want that neighbourhood residents develop these kind of new things, 
then you should be open to innovation.”   (CE initiator) 
 
This brings us to the question whether not only residents, but also LSA staff members 
are perceived to have sufficient expertise to support the establishment of CEs. 
 
5.5 The need for professionalization on both sides 
From the perspective of CE initiators, board members and entrepreneurs, we described a 
perceived lack of expertise in relation to the business plans, not only among active 
residents but also among LSA counsellors. Many respondents have acknowledged that 
the support project, which started in 2012 and continues to date, not only implies a full 
14 
 
learning process for nascent CEs but also a learning curve for the main supporting 
organisation. Again, we find evidence of a contradiction between the guiding principles 
and practice in the first three years of the support project. Even if nascent CEs are 
supposed to develop themselves, all eyes are turned to LSA to provide answers to the 
‘wicked questions’, as is exemplified by the following quote: 
 
“Well, you know, of course this is a fantastic project. Especially the option 
to acquire seed money, to really start something…On the other hand, you 
can see that LSA has a steep learning pathway ahead. How impractical some 
of the support is. How they dealt with the business plans. But just as we 
have to learn, LSA has to learn. And we can suffer occasionally from that. 
How long do you make people wait for the right answer?”   (CE initiators) 
 
While many respondents agree on the need of ‘professional’ advice form LSA, there are 
different opinions on the extent to which LSA staff members should have sufficiently 
‘professionalized’ at the start of the project’, as the project remains a learning pathway 
for them as well. Some respondents suggest that LSA should have a head start on the 
issues that were bound to arise in the genesis of local CEs: 
 
“We find that LSA is searching its way to a kind of format for community 
enterprises. That’s not bad, but it sometimes puts the brake on making 
progress. Then you are busy, writing down an idea and when you submit it 
or ask a question next time, you get quite different feedback […]. On the 
other hand, it would be nice if they were more knowledgeable than us on 
that point, so that they really could offer tailored advice. For example, if I 
ask a question about insurance, they should know the answer because they 
know that the question will rise.”   (Entrepreneur) 
 
Others are more critical and claim that LSA should basically have the expertise to clear 
the common problems of starting CEs, based on their [LSA’s] long involvement in the 
theme of bottom-up initiatives and community development: 
 
“I do not understand where they [LSA] derive their right to exist from. They 
have grappled with the theme for more than 20 years, but they have not been 
able to start the desired number of experiments and provide proper 
professional support to these experiments. This has lacked from the very 
beginning. Questions regarding legal status and regulations, tax issues, how 
to deal with allowances for volunteers, all of these could have been sorted 
out in advance.”   (Entrepreneur) 
 
Regardless of these differences in opinion, the bottom line of the responses is that 
professionals were needed to provide tailored support and to pave to way to getting the 
business plan funded and the CE established, but not professionals patronizing active 
citizens. Ironically, the need for professionals is exactly the line of thinking from which 
LSA tried to distinguish itself from the beginning of the project, essentially by claiming 
that residents (who are not by definition professionals) should be able to establish CEs 
within a relatively limited amount of time.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Across Europe, community entrepreneurship is increasingly being considered as a key 
component of bottom-up urban regeneration, especially in deprived neighbourhoods. 
However, residents in such areas are often assumed to lack entrepreneurial competences 
and skills. A plethora of policies has been enacted to support community entrepreneurs, 
alongside the advocacy of local entrepreneurship as being inherently good (Williams 
and Huggins, 2013, 176). Using a panel study with in-depth interviews, this paper has 
revealed how nascent Dutch community enterprises perceive the merits, limitations and 
unintended outcomes of support from LSA, a national resident platform that set up a 
project to experiment with the British concept of community enterprise.  
Our findings provide strong evidence for a ‘support paradox’; the support that 
was originally intended to overcome various entry barriers and difficulties on the road 
to bottom-up community entrepreneurship has in fact raised many obstacles to progress 
for many nascent CEs in the context of the LSA experiment. The main conclusion is 
that ‘making’ active citizenship in the form of community-based enterprise is extremely 
difficult, because these notions imply inherently bottom-up processes which are difficult 
to steer from above without creating resistance and frustration. 
The first and most fundamental paradox appeared in terms of the perceived 
opportunity to experiment with community enterprise. The term ‘experiment’, which 
was the starting point of the support project, suggests an approach with trial, error, and 
diversity in local solutions. While the literature on community enterprise posits that the 
local context and contingencies are crucial to the genesis, aims and functioning of CEs 
(Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Somerville and McElwee, 2011; Bailey, 2012), our results 
shows  substantial friction between the ‘muddling through’ efforts of CEs and their 
perception of a strict top-down support approach from the LSA. This approach has tried 
to mould residents’ initiatives into a single model of community-based entrepreneurship 
that tightly fits all criteria set by the LSA, defines the outcomes in advance and does not 
properly take into account the couleur locale. The resulting resistance from residents is 
hardly surprising from the perspective of earlier studies showing that ignoring local 
(entrepreneurial) cultures will likely result in sub-optimal or failing support (Dana and 
Dana, 2005; Williams, 2007; Hopp and Stephan, 2012; Fortunato and Alter, 2015). 
A second paradox concerns the framing of the experiment. LSA has positioned 
its support project in a discourse that emphasizes the inadequacy of local institutions (in 
particular local authorities and housing associations) to stimulate bottom-up initiatives, 
by claiming that these institutions hitherto have been too strict and bureaucratic in their 
dealings with active residents, thus only allowing for ‘traditional’ policy participation 
within a top down set of rules and regulations (LSA, 2011). Ironically, however, is the 
recurring observation from active residents that the way in which support was provided 
(or withheld) actually puts LSA in the same league of ‘old-fashioned’ institutions that it 
has so fiercely objected to. Paradoxically, the approach that was supposed to ‘liberate’ 
residents from traditional participation regimes has resulted in support measures that 
feel like a straitjacket for their beneficiaries. 
The third paradox relates to the supposed independent and self-sufficient nature 
of CEs, which is one of defining principles set by LSA. However, residents themselves 
claim that they lack the knowledge and skills to properly establish and manage CEs, 
need intensive support and therefore cannot be independent, at least in the starting up 
phase. Paradoxically, this stance is in line with earlier research (OECD, 2003; Greene et 
al., 2007; Williams and Williams, 2012), but opposed to the current active citizenship 
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and do-it-yourself policy discourse which claims that neighbourhood residents are 
equipped to and should self-organise in entrepreneurial terms (Wells, 2011; Bailey and 
Pill, 2015; Uitermark, 2015).  
A fourth and related paradox is that active residents have ascribed to the LSA 
the type of role that LSA had distanced itself from, i.e. professionals with expertise who 
provide direct answers when problems occur. A case in point is the mismatch between 
the procedure of business plan approval by the external evaluation committee, and the 
counselling offered, evidenced by a lacking consensus between the committee and LSA 
regarding the criteria for the business plan. This has resulted in delayed and improper 
advice and, consequently, frustration among many CE initiators. Even though nascent 
CEs were supposed to develop themselves, all eyes were usually turned to the LSA to 
provide answers to the ‘wicked questions’. These findings give reason to be very critical 
towards overly positive views on residents’ ability to self-organise in deprived 
communities (see also Kisby, 2010, Lawless, 2011), and to acknowledge that the help of 
supporting but not patronizing professionals remains necessary. This is easier said than 
done in light of contradictory support needs. On the one hand, respondents have claimed 
that several ‘entrance criteria’ (e.g. the business plan formats) have been unclear, but on 
the other hand, they argue that supporting professionals should not prescribe too much 
beforehand to allow for experimentation. This seems a very difficult balance to strike 
for support counsellors. The general lessons learnt here are 1) that support professionals 
have to balance carefully between providing guidelines and giving free rein to residents, 
and 2) that the commonly praised method of experimentation requires recognition of the 
fact that this does not only implies a full learning process for active citizens, but also a 
steep learning curve for supporting organisations. 
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